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Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) of
the macroeconomy assume that labor is traded in a spot market. Two
exceptions (Andolfatto [3], Merz [9]) combine the two-sided search
model of Mortenson and Pissarides, [14], [13], [15] with a one-sector
real business cycle model. These hybrid models are successful, in
some dimensions, but they cannot account for observed volatility in
unemployment and vacancies. Following a suggestion by Hall, [4] [5],
building on work by Shimer [18], this paper shows that a relatively
standard DSGE model with sticky wages can account for these facts.
Using a second-order approximation to the policy function I simulate
moments of an artificial economy with and without sticky wages. I
compute the welfare costs of the sticky wage equilibrium and find them
to be small.
1 Introduction
Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) of the macro-
economy are built around a spot market for labor. Two exceptions (Andol-
fatto [3], Merz [9]) combine the two-sided search model of Mortenson and
Pissarides [14], [13], [15] with a one-sector real business cycle model. These
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hybrid models are successful, in some dimensions, at explaining how unem-
ployment and vacancies move over the business cycle but they cannot account
for observed volatility in unemployment and vacancies (Shimer [18]). This
paper shows that a DSGE model with rigid wages can account for these facts.
Shimer [18] suggests that the problem with search theoretic models is that
they are typically closed with a Nash bargaining solution. Nash bargaining,
as a wage-setting mechanism, allows too much wage flexibility relative to
the data. Hall [4], [5], [6] has explored Shimer’s suggestion that models
with rigid or partially adjusting wages may be more successful than flexible
wage economies at explaining the facts. This paper builds on the Hall-Shimer
approach by constructing a fully specified dynamic general equilibriummodel
and studying the properties of alternative wage determination mechanisms.
I construct a version of a real business cycle model in which I add a
two-sided matching technology similar to that studied by Andolfatto [3] and
Merz [9]. I use this artificial economy to study the properties of three al-
ternative equilibria. In the first, the wage is chosen to mimic the social
planning solution; I call this a flexible wage economy. In the second equi-
librium the real wage grows at the rate of underlying technological progress
but is unresponsive to current productivity shocks. I call this the rigid wage
solution. Finally, I study an economy in which the real wage adjusts 15% of
the way towards the efficient solution in every quarter. I call this a sticky
wage economy.
I find two main results. The first is that the sticky wage economy does
a good job of explaining the time series properties of unemployment and
vacancies in the U.S.. The second is that the welfare costs of the sticky wage
equilibrium are small. Both of these properties have been shown to hold
in risk neutral economies (the first by Hall [5] and the second by Shimer
[19]); this paper shows that the main features of the Hall-Shimer sticky wage
equilibrium continue to hold in a standard production economy with risk
averse consumers and capital accumulation whilst preserving the ability of
the standard RBC model to explain other features of the data.
2 The Social Planning Problem
In this section I describe an artificial economy that adapts the standard one-
sector real-business-cycle model by adding a search technology for moving
labor between leisure and productive activities. I solve for the social planning
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optimum and I show how the model with unemployment and vacancies is
related to a standard environment with a spot market for labor.
2.1 Setting up the problem










− b (Ut + Vt)
¸
.
The first term in the square bracket represents the utility of consumption
which I take to be logarithmic. The second term represents the disutility of
working in market activity and the third is the utility cost of searching for a
job. The cost of search has two components; Ut is time spent searching by a
worker for a job, and Vt is time spent by the representative family in its role
as an employer searching for workers.
The stock of employment evolves according to the expression
Lt = (1− δL)Lt−1 +Mt,
where I assume that matches separate exogenously at rate δL. The term
Mt = B (Ut)
θ (Vt)
1−θ (1)
is the matching function which I take to be Cobb-Douglas with weight θ.
The problem is constrained by a sequence of capital accumulation con-
straints,
Kt+1 = Kt (1− δK) + Yt − Ct, t = 1...,
and by a production function,
Yt = (Kt)
α ¡(1 + g)tAtLt¢(1−α) . (2)
Output, Yt is produced using labor Lt and capital Kt which depreciates at
rate δK. The term (1 + g)
t measures exogenous technological progress and At
is an autocorrelated productivity shock which follows the stationary process
At = A
ρ
t−1 exp (εt) , 0 < ρ < 1,
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Et−1 (εt) = 0.
I assume that εt is a described by a Markov process with bounded support
and I let εt be the history of shocks, defined recursively as;
εt = εt−1 × εt,
ε1 = ε1.
The assumption of bounded support is required in Section 5 in which I com-
pute a second order approximation to the policy function.
2.2 Solving the Social Planning Problem
The social planner can alter the stock of workers in productive activities by
varying the search intensity of workers or firms. Since the stock of workers can
only be increased by hiring, one might think that the inclusion of employment
as a state variable would provide an additional propagation mechanism for
shocks. However, in practice the separation rate from firms is so high that the
labor market operates as if the entire workforce were fired and rehired every
period.1 In effect, movements in employment at business cycle frequencies
are caused by variations in search intensity either by firms or by workers.
To model the movements in unemployment and vacancies that would
be observed in an efficient allocation I solve the social planning problem. To
move labor into and out of productive activity the planner chooses contingent
sequences {Ut (εt) , Vt (εt)}. The first-order conditions for the choice of these



















Notice the symmetry in these expressions. From a planning perspective, the
most efficient way to move labor from leisure to employment is to increase
1Shimer [18] cites data from Abowd and Zellner [1] and from the Job Openings and
Labor Turnover Survey, to argue that separations occur at a rate of approximately 10%
per quarter in the U.S. data. This is a big number - it implies that 40% of the labor force
separates from employment in a year.
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unemployment and vacancies together; hence percentage movements in Ut
should be perfectly correlated with percentage movements in Vt.
By combining Equations (3) and (4) with the definition of the matching























Equation (5) is the consumption Euler equation and Equation (6) is
closely related to the static optimizing condition from a standard model.
The term (1− α)Yt/Lt is the marginal product of labor and CtχLγt is the
ratio of the marginal disutility of effort, χLγt , to the marginal utility of con-
sumption, 1/Ct. The constant κ measures the costs of search; as κ → 0,
Equation (6) converges to the familiar first order condition for labor in the
one-sector RBC model and, for small values of κ, the time paths of capital,
gdp, consumption and hours are close to the solutions obtained from an RBC
economy with a spot market for labor.
2.3 A Comparison with Previous Literature
The model so far is almost the same as that of Andolfatto [3] and Merz [9];
there are some differences in the way I have modeled search costs but these
are not important. My reason for reconsidering models of this kind is based
on the findings of Shimer [18] who points out that when search models are
closed with a Nash bargaining solution, the models deliver counterfactual
labor market predictions.
Unemployment and vacancies are two ways of moving labor from non-
market to market activities. In the Andolfatto and Merz models, these two
variables enter differently into utility since vacancies use units of commodities
but unemployment uses labor as an input. In the current model I have made
them symmetric (unemployment and vacancies both impose a time cost) to
emphasize a stark implication of the RBC model. In the social planning
solution both vacancies and unemployment should be procyclical.2
2In order to generate negatively correlated unemployment and vacancies, both Mertz
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3 Competitive Search Equilibrium
To decentralize the equilibrium in the usual way, one would require that
all of the objects that enter utility functions and production functions can
be traded, including time allocated to search by households and firms. For
example, one might conceive of competition between employment agencies.
Each agency would purchase, from households, the exclusive right to match
unemployed workers with available vacancies. Similarly the employment
agency would purchase, from firms, the exclusive right to match vacant jobs
with unemployed workers. The employment agency would use the available
constant-returns matching technology and produce matches which represent
a joint product valued both by firms and households. The match would be
sold to the worker-firm-pair at a competitive price that ensured zero profits
for the employment agency.
The employment market does not operate in this way, perhaps because
of moral hazard problems. In the decentralized solution envisaged by com-
petitive theory, unemployed workers receive compensation from employment
agencies for the right of exclusive representation. In practice it would be
difficult to enforce a contract in which the worker commits to sign-up with
a single agency. One might conceive of unemployed workers signing with
multiple agencies. Further, once matched, a household could refuse to take
a job and continue to search by selling its employment rights to a different
firm. This points to a problem with a decentralized solution to the matching
problem and it implies that there is inherently a missing market.
As an alternative to the standard decentralization, a number of authors
have studied decentralized search equilibria.3 In a search equilibrium, house-
holds and firms choose search intensities, U and V , taking the matching
probabilities as given. The problem of the missing market shows up as an
equilibrium concept with one fewer equations than unknowns. Typically,
this problem is solved by positing an ex-post Nash bargain in which the firm
and the worker split the surplus of a match according to an exogenous but
arbitrary bargaining weight.
and Andolfatto study versions of their respective models in which search intensity by
workers is fixed. Merz studies a version of her model with variable search intensity in
which she finds (Merz [9] Table 3 page 282) that unemployment and vacancies are positively
correlated.
3See the survey by Rogerson, Shimer and Wright [16] for a detailed description of works
in this literature.
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Espen Moen has proposed an alternative concept that he calls competitive
search equilibrium. In Moen’s work [10] the wage is determined by ex-ante
competition between market-makers, instead of the ex-post determination of
the wage with a Nash bargain. Moen conceives of firms and workers who
choose to search in one of many locations, each of which is run by a market-
maker. Market makers charge an entry fee to firms and workers for the right
to search at their location. In equilibrium, free-entry ensures that this fee
will be zero. The market maker posts the wage at which bargains will be
consummated if search takes place at his location. In a competitive search
equilibrium, entry is free and the wage is chosen to maximize the expected
utility of the worker; i.e. competitive search equilibrium decentralizes the
solution to the social planning problem.
4 A Decentralized Model
In this section I study a decentralized version of the model. I assume that a
representative worker/firm takes the real wage as given and chooses capital,
unemployment and vacancies to maximize expected utility. To close the
model I introduce three alternative solution concepts to determine the real
wage.
In the first solution concept I adopt the idea that competition between
market makers forces the wage to maximize the expected utility of potential
workers, that is, the wage is chosen to implement the social planning opti-
mum. I compare this solution with an alternative, suggested by Hall ([4]),
in which the real wage is unresponsive to current market conditions. I im-
plement this solution by assuming that the real wage is that which would
prevail along the non-stochastic balanced growth path. Since the fixed wage
solution leads to fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies that are too
volatile relative to the data, I also consider a third equilibrium concept in
which the real wage adjusts partially each period towards its optimal value.
4.1 Setting up the Problem
In a decentralized economy the representative agent acts both as a household
and as a firm. In its role as a household, the agent supplies labor LSt . His
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period utility function is






− b (Ut + Vt) ,
and labor supply in period t is related to search effort Ut and lagged labor
supply by the expression




M̄t/Ūt is the increase in employment when the household increases its search
intensity, Ut, by one unit. This probability is parametric to the household,
but is determined in equilibrium as the ratio of aggregate matches M̄t to
aggregate search intensity Ūt.
The representative worker/firm faces the following sequence of budget
constraints;4
Kt+1 = Kt (1− δK)+AtKαt
¡




t −WtLDt −Ct. t = 1, ...
(8)
The household can increase its stock of workers, LDt by incurring a utility
cost −bVt of search. Every additional unit increase in Vt leads to an increase
in the stock of employed workers of M̄t/V̄t where V̄t is aggregate search
intensity by all other firms and M̄t is the aggregate number of matches. This
leads to the following expression




which is the accumulation equation faced by the household in its role as a
labor demander.
4Although I have modeled an economy with a single asset, storable capital, nothing of
substance would be added by including a complete set of contingent claims markets. Since
this is a representative agent economy, additional markets would serve only to determine
the prices for additional assets at which the representative agent would choose not to
trade.
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4.2 Solving the problem















taking as given the production function (2) and the accumulation constraints













The first order conditions for the choice of time spent searching in his capacity


















In a competitive equilibrium, the model is closed by the market equilib-
rium conditions
Lt ≡ LSt = LDt , Ūt = Ut, V̄t = Vt,






Since there are two ways of moving labor between leisure and employ-
ment, but only one price, the model as it stands is missing an equilibrium
condition. Typically, a model of this kind would be closed by positing a Nash
bargaining solution to fix the real wage, Wt. The Nash bargaining solution,
for appropriate choice of bargaining weights, can be shown to implement the
social planning solution.5 Alternatively one might appeal to Moen’s idea of
5The generalized Nash bargaining solution divides the surplus of a match in proportion
to an exogenous bargaining weight. For the case of a Cobb-Douglas matching function,
this solution implements the social planning optimum when the bargaining weight is equal
to the elasticity parameters θ of the matching function. This result is a generalization of
the Hosios condition [8] to a model with more general utility functions.
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competitive market makers to argue that the wage will be chosen to maxi-
mize the expected utility of the representative worker. In either case, the




+ b (1− θ)Ct. (12)
Combining (12) with the equilibrium conditions and the first-order conditions
of the competitive model, Equations (10) and (11), leads to a pair of equa-
tions for unemployment and vacancies that are identical to the first-order
conditions of the Social Planner, Equations (3) and (4).
In the context of a search model with linear preferences, Hall [4] and
Shimer [18] have shown that the Nash solution leads to fluctuations of unem-
ployment and vacancies that are an order of magnitude too small compared
with the observed fluctuations in the data. Hall has suggested instead, that
one should look at a different equilibrium concept in the which the real wage
is fixed in the face of shocks. Unlike standard sticky-wage models, Hall’s
model does not present an incentive for an incumbent firm to offer a differ-
ent wage as long as the range of variation of shocks to the model leaves the
fixed wage within the range of variation permitted by the bargaining set.
Within the context of a standard search model with linear preferences,
Hall has shown that a sticky wage equilibrium is associated with fluctuations
of unemployment and vacancies of the same magnitude that one observes
in the data. The question remains however, as to whether this solution can
be combined with other features of a standard macroeconomic model and in
particular, whether existing features of a real business cycle model will be pre-
served once the labor market is modeled as a search equilibrium with wages
that are insensitive to productivity shocks. The following section addresses
this issue by studying the properties of equilibria under three alternative
wage determination mechanisms in the artificial economy described above.
5 Computational Issues
This section describes the procedure that I used to compute the properties
of equilibria in the artificial economy. I begin by describing the solution
algorithm that I used to compute the properties of artificial time series gen-
erated by the model. I then describe the alternative wage determination
mechanisms that I used to close the model.
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5.1 The Solution Algorithm
To compute solutions to the model I used a second order approximation to
the policy function due to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [17]. Their procedure
requires that the variables of the model be separated into a set of non prede-
termined variables pt and a set of predetermined variables qt. To implement
this procedure, one must first find a representation of the model in which all
of the variable are stationary.























, lt = log (Lt) ,





















The vector of predetermined variables qt consists of the variables
qt = {at, kt, wt−1, lt−1} ∈ R4,
and the vector of endogenous variables, pt is given by
pt = {yt, ct, lt, ut, vt,mt, zt, wt, jt} ∈ R9.
I assume that all uncertainty arises from stochastic productivity shocks that
take the form
at+1 = ρat + σεt+1
where εt+1 is an i.i.d. random variable with bounded support and unit vari-
ance and σ is the standard deviation of the innovation to the productivity
shock. The model is a set of equations
Etf (pt+1, pt, qt+1, qt) = 0, (13)
where the function f consists of a set of identities, model definitions and
first-order conditions. These equations are defined in Appendix A.
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5.2 Alternative wage determination mechanisms
To compute the decentralized solution under alternative wage determination
mechanisms I solved for the time path of wt in the social planning optimum.
This is given by the expression;
wSPt = log
¡
(1− α) θeyt−lt + b (1− θ) ect¢ .
Next I computed the steady state value w̄;
w̄ = log
¡
(1− α) θey−l + b (1− θ) ec¢ .
To compute alternative equilibria I simulated sequences for a set of equations
in which the wage is given by the expression
wt = (1− λ)wt−1 + λwSPt .
By setting λ = 1 this solution implements the social planning optimum.
Alternatively, setting λ = 0 fixes the wage equal to its unconditional mean
along the balanced growth path. Choosing any other value of λ in the interval
(0, 1) implements a partial adjustment mechanism in which the logarithm of
the real wage adjusts a fraction λ of the way towards the social planning
optimum in any given period.
The solution to the model, when it exists and is unique, is of the form
pt
9×1
= g (qt, σ) ,
qt+1
4×1
= h (qt, σ) + ησεt+1,
where σ is the standard deviation of the shock εt and η is the column vector
η = [1, 0, 0, 0]0 .
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe provide code that generates analytic first and sec-
ond derivatives of the function f in Equation (13).6 Evaluating these deriv-
atives at the point
p̄ = g (q̄, 0) , q̄ = h (q̄, 0)
6The exact relationship between these expressions and the Schmitt-Grohé-Uribe code
is explained in Appendix B.
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q̃t = (qt − q̄) , p̃t = (pt − p̄)










are bias terms that cause p̃t and q̃t to differ from zero when the model is
nonlinear. The variable
m̃t = q̃t ⊗ q̃t ≡ vec (q̃tq̃0t)
is a vector of cross product terms.
The Schmitt-Grohé-Uribe solution has a number of advantages over al-
ternative algorithms. First, it uses the symbolic math feature of Matlab to
compute analytic derivatives of a user specified set of functions. This fea-
ture mechanizes the process of solving for derivatives by hand and removes
a potential source of error. Second, the program computes a second order
approximation to the policy function which is essential if one is interested in
a welfare comparison of alternative wage determination mechanisms.
6 Taking the model to the data
Table 1a lists the values of four key moments that I used to calibrate para-
meters.
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Average ratio of consumption
to gdp
0.75
ls Labor’s share of gdp 0.66
ρ Autocorrelation of TFP 0.99
σε Standard deviation of TFP 0.007
I used these observed moments to calibrate the parameters g, β, δK and α.
Since the artificial economy is based on a Solow growth model, the parameter
g which represents the quarterly growth rate of technological progress is equal
to the quarterly per capita growth rate of gdp. This was set at 0.045 which
implies an annual per capita growth rate of 1.8%, equal to the U.S. average
for the past century. To calibrate the elasticity of capital in production, α,
I used the assumptions of competitive labor markets and constant returns-
to-scale which imply that α is equal to 1 − ls, where ls is labor’s share of
gdp.
To compute the time series properties of the productivity shock I com-








I regressed the log of TFP on its own lagged value and computed the first
order autocorrelation coefficient and the standard deviation of the residual.
This led to values of ρ = 0.99 and σε of 0.007.
To compute the discount factor and the quarterly depreciation rate I
solved the steady state equations,
(1 + r) = 1− δK + α
ky
, (16)
(g + δK) ky = 1− cy, (17)
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for ky, the steady state capital to gdp ratio and δK , the depreciation rate as
functions of r, α, g and cy. Equation (16) is a no-arbitrage relationship in
the asset markets and (17) is the steady state gdp accounting identity.
The unknowns r and cy were set equal to their historical averages in the
data; I set r = 0.162 which represents an annual rate of 6.5% (computed as
the average annual yield on the S&P 500) and cy = 0.75, which is the average
ratio of consumption to gdp when government consumption is included as
part of consumption.
The discount factor, β was set to 0.99 by solving the the steady state
Euler equation which implies that
β (1 + r)
(1 + g)
= 1.
Table 1b lists the values for the parameters g, β, δK and α, implied by this
calibration exercise.
















Elasticity of capital in production
0.34
Table 2a lists the moments from data that were used to calibrate key
labor market facts. I set the separation rate, δL, at 10% per quarter based
on Shimer’s [18] interpretation of the JOLT data, the unemployment rate at
5.8%, and the participation rate to equal 70%.
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Table 2a:
Labor Market: Parameters chosen to match moments








p Average participation rate 0.7
κ
Search wedge as a fraction
of consumption
0.1
γ Inverse labor supply elasticity 0
θ







The steady state values of U and L are related to the unemployment rate









Since the model contains a single representative agent, I normalized the pop-
ulation size to 1 and computed L and U from Equations (18) and (19). This
led to a value of L = 0.66, and U = .041 which implies that the representa-
tive agent spends 66% of his time in paid employment and 4.1% searching
for a job.
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Fraction of time searching
for workers
0.041
L Fraction of time working 0.66













The data on time spent searching by firms is based on an index of help
wanted. Since this is an index number, one cannot directly infer the relation-
ship of observed help-wanted to time spent searching by firms. To identify
the steady state value of V , I exploited the fact that U and V enter symmet-
rically to the social planning problem and I set V = [(1− θ) /θ]U .
There are two parameters to the matching function, θ and B. Blanchard
and Diamond [2] estimate θ to equal 0.4. In my calibration I set θ = 0.5 and
I set m = .066 to match the steady state accumulation equation
m = δLL.





gives a value for B = 1.62.
To pick the parameter γ I used the fact that real business cycle models
require high labor elasticity to generate sufficient volatility of hours. In the
base-line calibration I picked γ = 0 which has become standard following
Hansen’s work [11] on indivisibilities. The parameter κ indexes the costs of
search. It represents the wedge between the marginal product of labor and









To pick κ I experimented with simulations and found that the volatility of
unemployment and vacancies is highly sensitive to this parameter. I chose a
value of 0.1 to match the volatility of unemployment in the U.S. data when
the wage is chosen to be sticky with respect to current market conditions.
Having chosen κ, the parameters b and χ are implied by the steady state
values of the other variable and by the remaining parameterization. They
are given by the expressions








For my baseline calibration I find a value of b = 0.081 and χ = 1.18 which
implies that an extra hour spent searching for a job generates about 7% of
the disutility associated with an extra hour working.
7 Matching the Data
Table 3 reports the volatilities and correlations with gdp of gdp, consumption,
investment, hours worked, labor productivity, the real wage, unemployment
and vacancies. The first column reports the moments of the quarterly data
from 1955 first quarter, to 2002, fourth quarter. Consumption and investment
are both defined as the sum of private plus government components and all
variables are in 1996 U.S. dollars and deflated by U.S. resident population.
Hours is defined as employment per person multiplied by average hours where
employment is total non farm employment from the establishment survey.
Productivity is Gdp deflated by hours and the real wage is computed as
compensation to employees divided by hours and deflated by the 1996 Gdp
price index. Unemployment is the U.S. unemployment rate for persons over
16 years old and vacancies is an index of help wanted from the St. Louis
Federal Reserve data base. All variables have been passed through the HP
filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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Table 3
Standard deviations in percent (a) and correlations



















































































































The second two columns of Table 3 report the same moments for two
artificial economies. The middle panel is an economy in which the social
planner chooses unemployment and vacancies to move labor between em-
ployment and leisure; it was implemented by choosing the parameter λ to
equal 1 which allows the wage to adjust each period to a value that causes
the decentralized solution to mimic the social planning optimum. The third
panel reports data for an economy in which the log of the real wage adjusts
by a fraction 0.15 towards the social planning optimum in any given period.
I chose a value of 0.15 by experimenting with different values of λ between
0 and 1. When λ = 0, the real wage follows the balanced growth path and
is completely unresponsive to market conditions. For equilibria of this kind,
the standard deviation of gdp in 100 simulations of the model was equal 0.38
compared with a value of 1.69 in the data. The standard deviations of un-
employment and vacancies, in contrast were equal to 32 and 50, compared
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to 11.57 and 13 in the data. As I increased λ from 0 to 1 I found that, for
modest values of λ, gdp, consumption and investment are very similar in
the sticky wage and flexible wage economies. However, the standard devi-
ations of unemployment and vacancies are very sensitive to variations in λ.
I chose a value of λ = 0.15 to capture the observed standard deviation of
unemployment.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 are generated by simulating 100 runs of
the model for the baseline parameters setting λ = 1 for column 2 and λ =
0.15 for column 3. I refer to the former as a flexible wage economy and
to the latter as a sticky wage economy. The numbers in parentheses are
standard deviations of the reported parameter over 100 simulations. In each
case, the column labeled (a) reports the standard deviation of a variable and
the column labeled (b) is its correlation with gdp. All artificial data has
been passed through the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 in
the same way as the artificial data.
There are two features of Table 3 that are important. Notice first, that
gdp, consumption investment and hours have the same statistical properties
in the fixed wage and the flexible wage economies. In each case the corre-
lations with gdp and the standard deviations of these series are within one
standard deviation of each other. The reasons for the differences of these sta-
tistics from the U.S. data are, by now, well understood and the model does
not add much that is new in this dimension. The fixed and flexible wage
economies differ substantially, however, in their predictions for the behavior
of unemployment and vacancies.
In the data the standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are
equal to 11.57 and 13.00. Vacancies are procyclical with a correlation co-
efficient with gdp of 0.9 whereas unemployment is countercyclical with a
correlation coefficient of −0.86. In the social planning optimum, in contrast,
unemployment and vacancies each have a standard deviation of 6.26, they are
perfectly correlated with each other and correlated with gdp with a coefficient
of 0.43.
Contrast this with the sticky-wage artificial economy. Here, unemploy-
ment has a standard deviation of 11.02 and vacancies has a standard devia-
tion of 16.68. As in the U.S. data, these variables are negatively correlated
with each other. Vacancies is procyclical with a correlation coefficient with
gdp of 0.9 and unemployment is countercyclical with a correlation coefficient
with gdp of −0.88.
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8 Welfare Costs of Sticky Wages
If the sticky wage economy does a good job of replicating the real world
data, one might ask the question; what is the difference in welfare between
the flexible wage equilibrium and the equilibrium with sticky prices? To
answer this question, I computed a second order approximation to expected
utility for values of λ = 1, λ = 0.15 and λ = 0. When λ = 1, the simulated
data mimics the social planning solution and in this case the wage is equal,
each period, to a linear combination of the marginal product of labor and
the marginal disutility of work. When λ = 0, the wage grows each period
at the rate g, but is unresponsive to innovations in the technology shock.
For a value λ = 0.15, the wage adjusts each period by 15% of the difference
between its previous value and the optimal wage for the period.
To compute the welfare loss I specified utility as one element of the vector
of endogenous variables and obtained a second order approximation to the
time path of utility around its steady state value. Recall that the solution



































m̃t = q̃t ⊗ q̃t. (22)
Appendix C derives the following expressions for the unconditional expecta-
tions of the moment vector m̃
m̃ ' £I −Hqq ⊗ µq − hq ⊗ hq − µq ⊗Hqq¤−1 µ̄, (23)
and the unconditional expected value of deviations of the endogenous vari-
ables from their non-stochastic means E [p̃]
E [p̃] = µp +Gqqm̃. (24)
By taking the component of E [p̃] that corresponds to utility I can compute
the deviation of expected utility from its non-stochastic mean for alterna-
tive parameterizations of the artificial economy. To compute the equivalent
compensating variation in consumption (in the sense of Lucas ([12])) I com-
puted the percentage variation in permanent consumption that yields the
same variation in expected utility.
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Table 4











ρ = 0 0.0079 0.0072 0.0049
ρ = 0.5 0.0097 0.0074 −0.001
ρ = 0.99 0.0351 −0.0089 −3.48
Table 4 tabulates these percentage variations for alternative values of
ρ, the autocorrelation of the shock process, and λ the degree of real wage
inertia. The first surprising feature of these results (at least to me) is that
in the flexible wage economy the representative agent likes uncertainty. This
is not a computational error, it follows from the fact that the technology is
convex in inputs plus uncertainty.7 As the parameter λ moves further away
from 1, its efficient value, the expected utility gain from uncertainty decreases
and for some values of ρ and λ it becomes negative.
An interesting feature of these results is that, all but one of the entries in
this table is tiny. In an economy with no serial correlation the representative
agent would be prepared to pay less than one percent of permanent consump-
tion to live in a world of uncertainty. This is a welfare gain. The welfare loss
from sticky wages is even smaller. Holding constant the calibrated value of
the innovation to the productivity shock, the welfare loss of living in a sticky
wage economy (λ = 0.15) is 0.0007 percent of average consumption which is
about 4 cents per person per quarter.8
Higher serial correlation raises welfare costs of sticky wages because, when
the wage cannot adjust to market conditions, the representative agent’s con-
sumption and labor allocations may deviate from the first best for a very long
time. This is reflected in the third row of the third column of Table 4 which




1+γ , and C = AL. A is a random
variable, L is labor supply, C is consumption and ρ and γ are non-negative parameters.
If the representative agent chooses L to maximize expected utility his indirect utility, as
a function of A, is given by U = A
ε





. For ρ < 0.5 there are values
of γ for which this is a convex function of A. When there are opportunities for storage
this result holds for a much larger class of utility functions as the representative agent can
smooth consumption.
8This is computed as [(0.0097− .0072) /100] × 6000 where $6,000 is a rough estimate
of per capita quarterly consumption in 1996 dollars.
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reports the welfare loss of a wage that is completely insensitive to market
conditions. This number is approximately 3.5% of permanent consumption.
This is roughly $210 per quarter which is of a magnitude that begins to make
countercyclical policy seem attractive. However, numbers of this magnitude
persist only for the economy in which wages do not adapt at all to market
conditions.
The most relevant welfare number in this table, is the entry for a sticky
wage economy in which the real wage adjusts 15% of the way towards its
efficient value in any given quarter. For this economy, there is still a welfare
loss in the sticky wage economy, but it is much lower than in the rigid wage
economy. The representative agent would be willing to pay 0.062 per cent of
consumption in order to live in the flexible wage economy. This is roughly
$1.57 per person per quarter which is a relatively small number. If there are
unmodeled costs of more rapid wage adjustment, menu costs for example,
then welfare may well be higher in the sticky wage economy than in the
flexible wage solution.
9 Conclusion
I have shown that a relatively simple modification to a standard real business
cycle model, of the kind initially studied by Andolfatto and Merz, does a
very bad job of explaining the properties of unemployment and vacancies
in the U.S. data. The problem with this model is the one identified by
Shimer: unemployment and vacancies are not volatile enough and they have
the wrong correlation with gdp. I modified the model using Hall’s suggestion
that a model with rigid wages may provide a better representation of the
data. As pointed out by Hall, the rigid wage model does not leave firms or
workers with an incentive to change their behavior, in effect, because the
search model has a missing market.
Although the rigid wage model does better in some dimensions than the
flexible wage economy, it overshoots on unemployment volatility and leads
to gdp fluctuations that are too small. An intermediate model in which
the real wage adjusts by 15% of the way each quarter towards the flexible
wage solution, does a much better job. This model performs as well as the
standard RBCmodel at capturing the volatility of hours, gdp, investment and
consumption. In addition it captures the observed volatility of unemployment
and has close to the correct volatility for vacancies. More important, I find
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that unemployment is countercyclical and vacancies are procyclical, just as
they are in the U.S. data.
I compared the welfare properties of alternative equilibria and found that
the rigid wage solution is associated with a welfare cost of roughly $210 per
person, a relatively large number. The partial adjustment equilibrium, on
the other hand, is associated with a welfare cost of only $1.57 per quarter.
This suggest that there may some small unmodeled cost of wage adjustment
that is missing from the model, but which causes the sticky wage equilibrium
to dominate, at least for fluctuations of the magnitude that we have observed
in the post-war period.
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Appendix A: The function f
Production Function





e−ct+1(1− δK + αeyt+1−kt+1). (A2)
Gdp accounting identity
f3 = (1 + g)e
kt+1 − (1− δK)ekt − eyt + ect . (A3)
Technology shock process
f4 = at − ρat−1. (A4)
Utility function definition
f5 = ct − b(eut + evt)− χ
1 + γ
(elt)1+γ + βejt+1 − ejt . (A5)
Wage equation
f6 = wt − (1− λ)wlt − λ log
¡
θ(1− α)eyt−lt + (1− θ)χ(elt)γect¢ . (A6)
Vacancy first order condition
f7 = b− (1− α) emt+yt−lt−vt−ct + ewt+mt−ct−vt . (A7)
Unemployment first order condition
f8 = b− ewt+mt−ct−ut + χ(elt)γemt−ut . (A8)
Labor accumulation equation
f9 = e
lt − emt − (1− δL)ellt . (A9)
Definition of productivity
f10 = zt − yt + lt. (A10)
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Housekeeping equations
f11 = lt − llt+1, (A11)
f12 = wt − wlt+1. (A12)
Equations (A11) and (A12) occur because labor and the wage occur both
as endogenous and exogenous variables. As endogenous variables they are
represented by lt and wt and as lagged exogenous variables thay are repre-
sented by llt and wlt.
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Appendix B
The Schmitt-Grohé-Uribe code generates arrays hx, hxx, hσσ, gx, gxx and
gσσ. The arrays gxx and hxx are three dimensional and may be unpacked into
nine 9 × 4 and four 4 × 4 matrices respectively. The second order approxi-
mation in matrix form can then be written as follows
p̃t = gσσσ























where q̃t is 4× 1 and p̃t is 9× 1. Using Kronecker product notation and the
fact (see Hamilton [7] page 265) that



















































and µq = hσσσ
2, µp = gσσσ
2 leads to the expressions
p̃t = µp + gqq̃t +Gqqm̃t, (B9)
q̃t+1 = µq + hqq̃t +Hqqm̃t, (B10)
which corrspond to equations (14) and (15) in the text.
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Appendix C
Using Equations (25) we can write the unconditional expectation of the
moment matrix x̃x̃0 as follows
M̃ = E (q̃q̃0) = E
¡
µq + hqq̃ +Hqqm̃
¢ ¡
µq + hqq̃ +Hqqm̃
¢0
. (C1)













where o (σ3) denotes terms of order σ3 and higher. Using the vec operator





= µq ⊗ µ0q +Hqq ⊗ µqm̃+ hq ⊗ hqm̃









= m̃ and drop terms in σ3 and
higher to give the following second order approximation to the unconditional
expectation of the vectorized matrix of cross-product terms.
m̃ ' £I −Hqq ⊗ µq − hq ⊗ hq − µq ⊗Hqq¤−1 µ̄. (C4)
Using this expression for m̃ we obtain the following approximation for the
unconditional expected value of p̃, which is a vector of deviations of the
endogenous variables from their non-stochastic means.
E [p̃] = µp +Gqqm̃. (C5)
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Appendix D: The equations of the
model in levels
Social planning problem




− b (Ut + Vt) , (D1)




L1−αt − Ct (D2)
Lt = Lt−1 (1− δL) +Mt, (D3)






























B (θ)θ (1− θ)1−θ (D8)
Competitive Equilibrium





− b (Ut + Vt) , (D9)








t −WtLDt −Ct (D10)
LDt = L
D
























− χ ¡LSt ¢γ M̄tŪt (D14)
b =
1
Ct
M̄t
V̄t
(1− α)Yt
Lt
− Wt
Ct
M̄t
V̄t
(D15)
First best wage
Wt =
µ
(1− α) θYt
Lt
+ (1− θ)χLγtCt
¶
(D16)
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